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Compensatory strategies in processing facial emotions: 
Evidence fromprosopagnosia 
Jean-Yves Baudouin & Glyn W. Humphreys 
We report data on the processing of facial emotion in a prosopagnosic patient (H.J.A.). H.J.A. was 
relatively accurate at discriminating happyfrom angry upright faces, but he performed at chance 
when the faces were inverted. Furthermore, with upright faces there was no configuralinterference 
effect on emotion judgements, when face parts expressing different emotions were aligned to express 
a new emergent emotion. Wepropose that H.J.A.’s emotion judgements relied on local rather than on 
configuralinformation, and this local information was disrupted byinversion. A compensatory 
strategy, based on processing local face parts, can be sufficient to process at least some facial 
emotions. 
 
Prosopagnosia is a disability in recognising familiar peoplefrom their faces (Bodamer, 1947). The 
recognition of peoplefrom other cues – such as their voice or their gait – is generallypreserved, and 
the ability to recognise other visual categoriesof objects can sometimes be spared (for reviews, see 
Benton,1990; De Renzi, 1997;Young, 1992). Many studies also indicatethat prosopagnosic patients 
can sometimes process other kindsof facial information, such as emotional facial expressions 
andgender, whilst the matching of unfamiliar faces can be performedaccurately (for a review, see 
Nachson, 1995; Young & Bruce,1991). Reversed patterns of impairment, for example where 
theprocessing of facial emotion but not identity is impaired, has alsobeen reported (e.g., Humphreys, 
Donnelly, &Riddoch, 1993;Kurucz&Feldmar, 1979; Parry, Young, Saul, & Moss, 1991).Such data 
provide support for face recognition models where differentmechanisms are held to process 
contrasting types of facialinformation (identity, expression, gender, etc.; see, for example,Bruce & 
Young, 1986; Young, 1992; Young & Bruce, 1991).It is also established that facial information can be 
processedin a number of differentways. For instance, there is considerableevidence that face 
recognition mainly relies on the processing of configural or holistic information rather than on 
componentialanalysis of the parts of faces; this configural representationtakes into account not only 
the identity of features but also factorssuch as the distances separating features (for a review, 
seeRakover, 2002). Configural processing can also be observedwhen processing facial emotions (see 
Calder & Jansen, 2005;Calder, Young, Keane, & Dean, 2000). However, whilst configuralprocessing 
may be dominant and more efficient for faceprocessing, componential (parts-based) analyses can 
also play apart. For example, Cabeza and Kato (2000) compared the prototypeeffect in recognition 
memory for configural and featuralprototypes (the tendency to make false positive responses 
tonovel faces that are prototypical within the range of stimuli presented).They reported a tendency 
for participants to commitfalse alarms for both featural and configural prototypes.Following brain 
lesion there can be deficits in processing configuralinformation in faces (e.g., Boutsen& Humphreys, 
2002;De Gelder&Rouw, 2000; Levine &Calvanio, 1989; Saumier,Arguin, &Lassonde, 2001). These 
deficits are demonstratedeither by the absence of an usual configural effect in 
prosopagnosicpatients (e.g., Boutsen& Humphreys, 2002; Saumier etal., 2001), or by a paradoxical 
configuration effect (where faceprocessing is better when the saliency of configural informationis 
reduced, e.g., with upside-down faces, De Gelder&Rouw, 2000). Though such patients may be able to 
conduct parts-basedanalyses of faces, such analyses are either inefficient for the taskat hand or 
patients may be overwhelmed by impaired configuralinformation, which interferes with responses to 
local parts (e.g.,Boutsen& Humphreys, 2002; De Gelder&Rouw, 2000, seealso De Gelder&Rouw, 
2001).To date, most studies of configural processing in prosopagnosiahave concentrated either on 
recognition tasks or on tasksrequiring responses to the structural identity of faces (e.g., 
identitymatching). Consequently, we know little about the role thatconfigural or local part processing 
might play in the analysisof non-identity information by patients with face processingimpairments. 
Indeed, it is possible that some of the dissociationsreported between processing facial identity and 
otherfacial properties might reflect the differential contribution ofcomponential analyses to 
contrasting face processing tasks –for example, if componential analyses can support tasks such 
asgender or emotion discrimination even when they fail to supportface recognition. Indeed, Parry et 
al. (1991) state that “itis possible that some of the dissociations reported in the existingliterature 
might actually reflect the effect of different taskdemands, rather than the existence of dissociable 
face processingpathways” (p. 549). This point is particularly pertinent whenwe consider emotion 
recognition, which can involve the assignmentof faces into a limited number of emotion categories 
(seeEkman, 1992; Ekman & Friesen, 1975). Here it is possible thatlocal information about the shape 
of the mouth or eyebrowsmay be sufficient to assign a face to an emotion category. Thereis prior 
evidence that componential analyses can be used tosupport identity judgements in a limited set of 
circumstances(e.g., Newcombe, 1979; Young & Ellis, 1989). For example,Newcombe (1979) observed 
that prosopagnosic patients hadnormal performance in identity matching when hairstyle wasvisible, 
but not when it was cancelled. Such effects may be evenmore pronounced when facial emotions 
have to be categorized.In the present study, we report the case of a severelyprosopagnosic patient, 
H.J.A., who is impaired at identifyingany famous or familiar faces by sight (Humphreys 
&Riddoch,1987; Humphreys et al., 1993). H.J.A. also shows poor discriminationof gender and facial 
emotion (Humphreys et al.,1993). Humphreys and Riddoch (1987) initially reported thatH.J.A. tended 
to use individual features rather than configuralrepresentations to recognise faces. This is supported 
by studiesof H.J.A.’s memory for facial information, since he canremember individual features of 
faces whilst being impaired atmaking judgements from memory about the configural 
properties(Young, Humphreys, Riddoch, Hellawell, & De Haan,1994). More recent investigations have 
confirmed that H.J.A.does not benefit from configural information in perceptual discriminationtasks, 
when required to discriminate ‘normal’ from‘thatcherised’ faces (where local parts have been 
inverted). Here,for example, he shows an (abnormal) advantage for face partsover whole faces, 
though face parts appearing in isolation lackimportant configural cues (Boutsen& Humphreys, 
2002).Tests of H.J.A.’s ability to discriminate facial emotion are ofinterest because H.J.A. is able to 
use different forms of informationto support task performance. For example, in earlierstudies H.J.A. 
performed normally when he had to recognize facial emotion from a pattern of moving points placed 
on faces.Also, though impaired with static images, his emotion judgementsnevertheless remained 
above chance. It is possible thatthis residual ability with static faces is based on local facial 
features.Such a pattern would be consistent with arguments madefrom studies of object processing 
in H.J.A., where the evidencesuggests that local features are extracted but not well integrated(see 
Humphreys, 1999). This was investigated here. It shouldalso be noted that the study took place some 
ten years after theinitial study of H.J.A.’s processing of facial emotion. Studies ofH.J.A.’s object 
processing have revealed that, over a protractedperiod following his lesion, H.J.A. improved at using 
visualinformation for some tasks even though basic visual processing 
remained at a constant level (Riddoch, Humphreys, Gannon,Blott, & Jones, 1999). It is possible, then, 
that at the time of thepresent investigation, H.J.A. may be able to use local features toperform 
emotion judgements even if his configural processingremains impaired. This may reflect some 
compensatory recoveryalong with a stable perceptual impairment.In the present paper we tested 
H.J.A.’s ability to process facialemotion when we varied the information available for makingthe 
judgements. In Experiment 1, H.J.A.’s ability to processfacial emotion was assessed with upright 
whole faces, whereboth parts-based and configural information may be present.Subsequently, H.J.A. 
performed the same task with upside-downfaces. Face inversion is known to interfere with the 
processing ofconfigural and relational information in faces (for reviews, seeHancock, Bruce, & 
Burton, 2000; Valentine, 1988). If H.J.A.was disrupted in emotion judgements by the presence of 
configuralinformation (De Gelder&Rouw, 2000), then he may(paradoxically) improve when 
presented with inverted relativeto upright faces (though see Boutsen& Humphreys, 2002, 
forcontrary evidence in a tasks stressing the processing of structuralidentity). In a second study, 
H.J.A. performed an emotionrecognition task using composite faces (see Young, Hellawell&Hay, 
1987). Calder et al. (2000) examined facial emotion judgementsto composite faces and reported 
evidence for a role ofconfigural processing. They found that recognition of the emotionof one facial 
part (top or bottom) was interfered with by thealignment of another half part that displayed another 
emotion.This effectwas not observed when both parts were misaligned orwhen the faces were 
upside-down. Such results suggest that thealignment of parts expressing different emotions creates a 
new,emergent emotional configuration, that interferes with access tothe emotions present in the 
separate parts. This interfering configuralinformation is made less salient when faces are inverted,so 
the disruptive effect of alignment is reduced. Recently, Calderand Jansen (2005) have further studied 
the composite effect onthe recognition of facial emotions, suggesting that it arises atan early stage in 
face processing (i.e., at a structural encodingstage), common to both facial identity and facial 
expressionprocessing. If H.J.A. is sensitive to configural information whenmaking emotion 
judgements, then, like normals, he should beimpaired when facial parts expressing different 
emotions arecombined, even when the response ought to be made to just onepart, and this effect 
should reduce under face inversion. However, previous testing of H.J.A.’s ability to process 
configuralinformation has shown that he is impaired at using this informationto perform both 
recognition and discrimination tasks(Boutsen& Humphreys, 2002; Humphreys &Riddoch, 1987;Young 
et al., 1994). We can then predict that H.J.A. would notmanifest effects of configural information in a 
facial emotiontask, if the composite effect arises at a common level for bothidentity and emotion 
judgements (Calder & Jansen, 2005). Anyability to judge facial emotions would then not depend on 
’normal’configural processes, but rather it would result from thecompensatory use of local 
information 
1. Case history 
H.J.A., born in 1920, was an executive in an Americancompany before he suffered a peri-operative 
posterior cerebralartery stroke in 1981. Previous investigations have demonstratedthat H.J.A. has 
visual agnosia, prosopagnosia, alexia withoutagraphia, achromatopsia, and topographical 
impairments (fordetailed neurological and psychological reports, see Humphreys&Riddoch, 1987; 
Riddoch et al., 1999). The stoke resulted inbilateral lesions to the occipital lobe extending towards 
the anteriortemporal lobe.AMRI scan in 1989 revealed bilateral lesionsof the inferior temporal gyrus, 
the lateral occipitotemporalgyrus,the fusiform gyrus, and the lingual gyrus. In prior studies ofhis face 
processing abilities (Humphreys et al., 1993; see alsoBoutsen& Humphreys, 2002; Young et al., 1994), 
it has beenfound that H.J.A. is severely impaired at both face identification(he failed to name or 
provide any semantic information about 20famous faces) and familiarity discrimination (he was 50% 
correct– i.e., at chance level – when he was told to decide whetherthe 20 famous faces mixed with 
20 unknown faces were familiaror not). He is also impaired at using facial configurations in 
discriminationtasks. For example, unlike normal subjects, H.J.A.was better at judging whether a 
facewas normal or ‘thatcherised’(had its eyes and mouth inverted) when presented with the 
faceparts in isolation relative to when he was presented with a fullface. In contrast, normal 
participants use configural informationin whole faces to facilitate discrimination relative to when 
faceparts are shownin isolation (Boutsen&Humphreys, 2002). Consistentwith H.J.A. having a 
perceptual form of prosopagnosia,there was no evidence for implicit recognition (e.g., 
Lander,Humphreys & Bruce, 2004), and his semantic knowledge aboutpeople familiar before his 
lesion is reasonably spared (Young etal., 1994). Similarly, H.J.A.’s conceptual knowledge about 
emotionsis intact, and he can access knowledge about emotions frommoving facial expressions 
(Humphreys et al., 1993). H.J.A. was81 years old at the time of testing. 
2. General method 
2.1. Controls 
H.J.A.’s performance was compared with that of four agematchedmale controls, aged from 74 to 86 
years olds (controlA: 86, control B: 74, control C: 81, control D: 74). The controlsreported no 
antecedent neurological or psychiatric disorders.They also had either normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision, withthe exception of control A, who reported some problems in seeingdistant stimuli, whilst 
control C had a small blind area offield. All the controls performed the upright versus upside-
downfacial-emotion recognition task. ControlsAandBperformed thecomposite task on the top halves, 
controlsAand C on the bottomhalves. There was no evidence of any differential 
performancebetween the controls as a function of their age. 
2.2. Material 
We used 75 high-resolution colour photographs of 25 individuals,all seen from a frontal viewpoint 
and expressing threekinds of emotion; happiness, anger, and fear. The head sizes werestandardised 
(15 cm from top to bottom). Photographs were ofvolunteers from 18 to 31 years old, who were 
instructed to posewith various emotional facial expressions. These photographswere presented with 
another set of emotional photographs to agroup of 11 young control subjects who were asked to 
classifythe emotions into six categories (“happiness”, “sadness”, “fear”,“disgust”, “anger”, “neutral”, 
and “other”). For each emotionthere was at least 82% agreement for the classification acrossthe 
control subjects. The experimental task was a two-choiceemotion-discrimination, requiring 
participants to judge whetherhappiness or anger was being expressed. Happiness and angerwere 
preferred to other possible pairs of emotions because (i)they are visually easy to discriminate, with 
various distinctivecues on both the bottom and the top parts, (ii) in the study byCalder et al. (2000), 
participants made similar proportions oferrors when identifying the emotion displayed in the top 
parts offaces for happiness and anger (respectively, .20 and .28). Theseproportions were not 
equivalent for the bottom part (respectively,.01 and .49), but the only emotion with a low 
proportionof errors for the bottom halves of faces was disgust (.14), butthis emotion had the 
disadvantage of being hard to recognize from the top part (.62). To rule against angry emotions 
beingparticularly difficult to identify from the bottom halves of thefaces we used, we pre-selected 
faces so that the two emotionswere equally discriminable. The top and bottom halves of eachface 
were separated by cutting the face horizontally at the levelof the bridge of the nose. These half faces 
were presented toa new group of eight young control subjects who had to say ifthe faces were 
happy, angry, or fearful.We selected 20 top partsand 20 bottom parts, and within each set 10 were 
judged happyand the other 10 were judged angry by at least 6/8 control subjects.Five top and five 
bottom angry parts as well as four topand four bottom happy parts were from the same original 
fullphotographs. Consequently, the 40 selected parts were derivedfrom 31 full photographs. These 
31 photographs were also usedin the emotion recognition tasks with full faces. Overall, fromthe 
original 25 people photographed, 5 were used for both thehappy and angry conditions, 10 for the 
happy condition only,and 10 for the angry condition only. 
 
Fig. 1. Illustration of composite and noncomposite emotions 
 
The selected half faces expressing each emotion were associated with the counterpart of the same 
person with another emotion. In addition, we used faces expressing fear as the alternative 
(irrelevant) part of the critical faces on half the trials. Thiswas done in order to stop participants from 
guessing the criticalexpression after detecting the expression in the irrelevant part ofthe face; both 
happy and angry faces were equally likely to bepaired with a fearful part face. For the critical 10 
angry half parts,5 were associated with a happy counterpart and 5 with a fearfulone; for the critical 
10 happy half parts, 5 were associated witha angry counterpart and 5 with a fearful one. Composite 
versusnoncomposite faces were created by aligning the top and bottomhalves of the faces (to create 
a composite emotion) or by shiftingthe top photograph to the left or right of the bottom one by 
abouthalf the face’s width (the noncomposite emotion condition, seeFig. 1 for an illustration). The 
side of the shift was varied acrossstimuli with an equal proportion of each shift in each 
responsecategory. From this we obtained 20 composite and 20 noncompositeemotions, half with a 
happy top and an angry bottom half,and half with an angry top half and a happy bottom half. 
2.3. Procedure 
The photographs were presented on a monitor approximately1m from the subject’s eye, with E-
prime. A trial consisted inthe presentation of a fixation cross for 500 ms, followed by ablank screen 
for 500 ms. After this a photograph appeared andremained on the screen until the subjects 
responded. For all thetasks, subjects were required to press one key on a keyboardfor a happy face 
or half face, and another key for an angry faceor half face. Participants were instructed to respond as 
fast aspossible, but without neglecting accuracy. 
2.4. Experiment 1: emotion judgements to full upright orupside-down faces 
The 31 full photographs were presented in a random order intwo separate sessions; the faces were 
upright in one and invertedin the other session. H.J.A. as well as controls A, B, and Dperformed the 
upright session first. Control C performed theupside-down session first. 
2.5. Experiment 2: emotion judgements to composite versusnoncomposite faces 
There were two sessions. In one the subject had to respond tothe top face part, and in the other 
session the task was to respondto the bottom half, without paying attention to the other part. The 
20 composite and 20 noncomposite emotions were presented inan upright orientation, in a random 
order in each session, with theface part required for the decision being placed at the centre ofthe 
screen. H.J.A. and two controls performed each session twotimes on different days. Controls A and B 
performed the task onthe top halves of the faces, whereas controls A and C performedthe session on 
the bottom halves. When an interference effectfrom the counterpart emotion was observed in the 
compositecondition (i.e., lower accuracy or/and longer response time thanfor noncomposite 
emotions), subjects were required to performthe same task with upside-down stimuli. This last task 
was carriedout to ensure that any interference with upright compositefaces was due to configural 
information that should be strongerin upright than in inverted faces. 
2.6. Data analysis 
For all tasks, we tested whether H.J.A. and controls significantlydiffered from chance level by 
computing χ2 statisticaltests. H.J.A. and individual controls were considered as singlecases. H.J.A.’s 
accuracy was also contrasted with that of thecontrols in Experiment 1 to see if he was impaired at 
recognizing emotions from full faces. χ2 statistical tests were alsoused for each participant to 
compare the critical conditions inExperiment 1 (upright versus upside-down) and Experiment 
2(composite versus noncomposite). RTs were analysed by itemsby Mann–Whitney U statistic 
between latencies for correctresponses in contrasting conditions. 
3. Experiment 1: recognition of emotions from fullupright and upside-down faces 
3.1. Results 
The results for H.J.A. and the age-matched controls are presentedin Table 1. 
 
3.1.1. H.J.A. 
H.J.A. performed at a better than chance level with uprightfaces (83.9% correct, χ2(1) = 14.23, p < 
.001), but not withupside-down faces (38.7% correct, χ2(1) = 1.58). The differencebetween upright 
and inverted faces was reliable (38.7% versus83.9% correct, χ2(1) = 46.74, p < .0001). RTs for upright 
versusupside-down faces were not analysed because of H.J.A.’s chancelevel of performance with 
inverted faces. Although better thanwith inverted faces, H.J.A.’s accuracy for upright faces was 
significantlylower than that of the mean of the controls (83.9%versus 95.2% correct, χ2(1) = 8.58, p < 
.01), though it did notdiffer significantly from the least accurate control (83.9% versus90.0%, χ2(1) = 
1.48). H.J.A.’s performance with inverted faceswas impaired relative to both the mean of the controls 
(38.7%versus 87.1%, χ2(1) = 64.58, p < .0001) and to the worst control(38.7% versus 83.9%, χ2(1) = 
46.74, p < .0001). 
3.1.2. Controls 
All controls performed at a better than chance level withboth upright and upside-down faces. For 
upright faces, controlsA and C: 100% correct, χ2(1) = 31.00, p < .0001; controlB: 90.3% correct, χ2(1) 
= 20.16, p < .0001; control D: 96.8%correct, χ2(1) = 27.13, p < .0001. For inverted faces, controlsA and 
D: 90.3% correct, χ2(1) = 20.16, p < .0001; control B:83.9% correct, χ2(1) = 14.23, p < .001; control C: 
97.1% correct,χ2(1) = 17.06, p < .0001. Controls A, C, and D, but not control B, were significantly less 
accurate for upside-down faceswhen compared with upright faces (control A: 90.3% versus100%, 
χ2(1) > 4.13, p < .05; control B: χ2(1) = 1.48; control C:87.1% versus 100%, χ2(1) > 9.30, p < .01; 
control D: 90.3% versus96.8%, χ2(1) = 4.13, p < .05), whereas controls B–D, but notcontrol A, were 
significantly slower with inverted faces (controlA:U(28, 31) = 363, z = 1.08; control B: 2963 ms versus 
1366 ms,U(26, 28) = 97, z = 4.62, p < .0001; control C: 3124 ms versus1022 ms, U(27, 31) = 0, z = 6.52, 
p < .0001; control D: 946 msversus 662 ms, U(28, 30) = 129, z = 4.53, p < .0001). 
3.2. Discussion 
H.J.A. generally performed at a lower level than the controls,confirming prior reports of H.J.A. being 
impaired at judgingemotion from static facial images (Humphreys et al., 1993).Nevertheless, H.J.A. 
was able to make the forced-choice judgementsat a reasonable level, when presented with upright 
faces.He also showed a strong effect of inversion, with performancedropping to chance level when 
faces were inverted.With controlsinversion lowered accuracy and increased RTs, but 
performancewas always substantially above chance. The detrimental effectof inversion here mirrors 
prior data with H.J.A. when he wasrequired to make judgements about the structural properties 
offaces (Boutsen& Humphreys, 2002). In each case, there is noevidence for a paradoxical, beneficial 
effect of face inversion, aswould be expected if H.J.A. was disrupted by configural 
informationpresent in faces (cf. De Gelder&Rouw, 2000). Insteadthe data suggest that the 
information used by H.J.A. to classifyfacial emotion in the images was strongly degraded by 
inversion.From Experiment 1, however, we cannot tell if H.J.A. wasusing configural information to 
make the emotion judgementsor whether his judgements were based on face parts, which 
weredegraded by inversion along with any degradation of the configuralinformation present (for a 
report on an inversion effectin participants performing a featural-change detection task, 
seeMondloch, Le Grand, & Maurer, 2002). Whether local part orconfigural information was being 
used by H.J.A. was tested inExperiment 2, where we compared performance with compositeand 
noncomposite faces. If there is configural processing, judgementsto a face half should be disrupted 
when the half is part ofa face composite compared with when it is in a noncompositeimage. 
 
4. Experiment 2: recognition of composite versusnoncomposite facial emotion 
 
4.1. Results 
The results are illustrated in Fig. 2. 
 
4.1.1. H.J.A. 
H.J.A. performed at chance level when attending to the emotionof the top parts of the faces for both 
composite (55%correct, χ2(1) = .40) and noncomposite faces (57.5% correct,χ2(1) = .90). When 
attending to the emotion of the bottomFig. 2.part, H.J.A. performed better than chance for both 
composite (67.5% correct, χ2(1) = 4.90, p < .05) and noncomposite emotions (67.5% correct, χ2(1) = 
4.90, p < .05). Therewas no significant difference between composite and noncomposite emotions. 
RTs for correct responses were analysed when attending to the bottom part: there was no significant 
difference between composite and noncomposite faces (U(27, 27) = 321, z = .75). Thus, H.J.A. 
showed no interference from configural information from the whole face when attending to a half 
part to make an emotion decision. For this reason, he did not perform the tasks with upside-down 
stimuli. 
 
  
4.1.2. Controls 
When attending to the emotion in the top parts of thefaces, controls A and B responded better than 
chance withnoncomposite stimuli (control A: 75% correct, χ2(1) = 10.00,p < .01; control B: 82.5% 
correct, χ2(1) = 16.90, p < .0001),but not to composite stimuli (both controls: 57.5% correct,χ2(1) = 
1.80). The difference between composite and noncompositeemotions was reliable (control A: 57.5% 
versus75%, χ2(1) = 6.53, p < .05; control B: 57.5% versus 82.5%,χ2(1) = 17.32, p < .0001). With upside-
down stimuli, controlsA and B responded better than chance for both composite(control A: 77.5% 
correct, χ2(1) = 12.10, p < .001; control B:82.5% correct, χ2(1) = 16.90, p < .0001) and noncomposite 
stimuli(control A: 75% correct, χ2(1) = 10.00, p < .01; control B:67.5% correct, χ2(1) = 4.90, p < .05). 
There was no significantdifference between the judgement to composite and noncompositestimuli, 
with the exception of control B who was moreaccurate for composite faces, i.e., the reverse of the 
usual compositeeffect (control A: χ2(1) = .13; control B: 82.5% versus67.5%, χ2(1) = 4.10, p < .05). 
There were no differences in RTsacross the conditions, though there was a tendency for controlB to 
be slower with composite than with noncompositeemotions (2463 ms versus 1628 ms, U(27, 33) = 
322, z = 1.84,p < .07), suggesting that his better accuracy for inverted compositefaces resulted from a 
speed accuracy trade-off effect. 
Thus, controls exhibited a strong interference effect from configuralinformation in upright but not 
inverted faces when theyhad to recognise the emotion of the top half of composite stimuli.When 
attending to the bottom parts of the faces, controlsA and C were better than chance for both 
composite (controlA: 85% correct, χ2(1) = 19.60, p < .0001; control C: 85% correct,χ2(1) = 19.60, p < 
.0001) and noncomposite faces (controlA: 97.5% correct, χ2(1) = 36.10, p < .0001; control C: 95% 
correct,χ2(1) = 32.40, p < .0001), but they were less accurate withcomposite than with noncomposite 
faces (control A: 85% versus97.5%, χ2(1) = 25.64, p < .0001; control C: 85% versus 95%,χ2(1) = 8.42, p 
< .01). RTs did not differ across the conditions.With upside-down stimuli, controls A and C responded 
betterthan chance for both composite (control A: 77.5% correct,χ2(1) = 12.10, p < .001; control C: 
67.5% correct, χ2(1) = 4.90,p < .05) and noncomposite stimuli (control A: 80% correct,χ2(1) = 14.40, p 
< .001; control C: 72.5% correct, χ2(1) = 8.10,p < .01), and there was now no significant difference 
betweencomposite and noncomposite faces (control A: χ2(1) = .16; controlC: χ2(1) = .50). There were 
no reliable RT differences acrossthe conditions with inverted faces. 
In sum, the controls showed an interference effect from compositefaces, both when attending to the 
top and the bottom halfof the faces. This interference effect was eliminated when thefaces were 
inverted, providing converging evidence that it wasdue to configural information in upright faces. 
These resultswith elderly controls match those reported with young controlsby Calder et al. (2000). 
4.2. Discussion 
Contrary to controls, H.J.A. showed no interference fromconfigural information when he had to 
judge emotions fromparts of a face. At least for the bottom half of the face he was asaccurate for 
composite as for noncomposite faces. In contrast,controls showed a composite effect in the 
processing of bothparts with upright faces, with the discrimination of emotion forpart of the face 
being affected by the irrelevant part of a compositeface, making them less accurate for facial 
composites thanfor noncomposite faces. This composite effect appears to resultfrom the creation of 
a new emotional configuration, since it wasnot evidenced with upside-down faces.The finding that 
H.J.A. was only better than chance withjudgements to the bottom half of faces suggests that he is 
stronglydependent on features such as the form of the mouth, whenmaking emotion judgements. 
The effect is unlikely to be dueto H.J.A.’s upper altitudinal field defect, given that the stimuliwere 
present for unlimited durations and H.J.A. is perfectly ableto scan across the visual field (e.g., see 
Humphreys, Riddoch,Quinlan, Price, & Donnelly, 1992). Also, it should be notedthat H.J.A.’s 
judgements to the bottom half of both compositeand noncomposite faces, in Experiment 2, were 
lower than hisjudgements to whole faces in Experiment 1 (respectively, 67.5%versus 83.9%). This 
suggests that features in the top half of thefaces were processed and contributed to his decision 
when theywere consistent with features in the bottom half (in whole facesin Experiment 1, but not in 
composites and noncomposites inExperiment 2). 
5. Conclusion 
The prosopagnosic patient H.J.A. was able to discriminatebetween happy and angry emotions in 
static, full faces whenthey were upright, though performance was impaired relative tocontrols. He 
also showed an inversion effect, with performancefalling to chance when faces were inverted. With 
facial compositesH.J.A.’s emotion judgements were less accurate again,though he still performed 
above chance when judging the emotionsexpressed in the bottom halves of faces. However, 
hisemotion judgements were not influenced by whether the halveswere presented within a 
composite or noncomposite face. Thecontrol participants were also affected by inversion with 
fullfaces, but, unlike H.J.A., they were also disrupted when facehalves were part of a composite 
relative to a noncompositeimage. The disruptive effect of the composite was eliminatedwhen faces 
were inverted, linking the disruptive effect to configuralcues emerging from composite, upright 
faces.These data indicate that there can be a residual ability to judgefacial emotions at an above 
chance level, even with a patientwith severe prosopagnosia who is apparently unable to accessany 
stored knowledge based on the structural identity of faces(e.g., in familiarity judgements, or in tests 
sensitive to implicitknowledge about faces; e.g., Lander et al., 2004). However, thisdoes not mean 
that facial information about emotions is processednormally in such a case. Our study indicates that 
H.J.A.’sprocessing of facial emotion differed qualitatively from that ofcontrol participants. Control 
participants appeared sensitive toconfigural information present in whole, upright faces (see 
alsoCalder et al., 2000). H.J.A. did not, since he was unaffectedby our manipulation contrasting 
composite with noncompositefaces. Instead, we suggest that H.J.A. based his emotionjudgements on 
the presence of critical local features. There wasparticular weight placed on features in the lower half 
of the face,but there was also some contribution from features in the upperregion when they 
matched features in the lower region. Thismay represent a residual, feature-based process that is 
presentwhen normal participants make judgements to facial emotion,with the process being 
revealed when the extraction of configuralinformation is disrupted by a brain lesion. Alternatively,it 
may represent a compensatory strategy developed by H.J.A.,perhaps even linked to his spared ability 
to use facial motion tomake emotion judgements (Humphreys et al., 1993). For example,movements 
of the mouth may be particularly salient whenpeople change emotional expression, leading to H.J.A. 
weightingthat region strongly even when asked to make emotionaljudgements to static images. 
Whatever the case, the importantpoint is that we should be cautious to infer functionally 
separateprocesses for extracting facial emotion and identity from acase such as H.J.A.’s, where 
identity judgements are at floor butemotion judgements are above chance. This does not mean 
thatemotion judgements operate in a normal manner.Given that H.J.A. showed no sign of using 
configural information(Experiment 2; see also Boutsen& Humphreys, 2002;Humphreys&Riddoch, 
1987;Young et al., 1994), it is of interestthat he was strongly affected by face inversion, in 
Experiment 1.This in turn suggests that inversion effects are not solely due tothe loss of configural 
cues, but they can also come about becausethe processing of local facial features is sensitive to their 
familiarorientation. The degree to which a feature-based strategy canplay a role in emotion 
judgement probably also depends on thechoice of emotions being tested. Here we examined the 
contrastbetween angry and happy faces, and feature-based cues may bea relatively reliable means of 
distinguishing these two emotions.As finer distinctions are required, we may expect that 
emergent,configural cues will play a more important part. This requiresempirical testing.Another 
point is the fact that H.J.A. mainly relied on thebottom half of the face to recognise facial emotion. In 
recentstudies, Caldara et al. (2005) have reported a similar observationwith another prosopagnosic 
patient engaged in face recognition.Moreover, Bukach, Bub, Gauthier, and Tarr (2006) reportedthat 
it is possible to main observe a ‘local expertise effect’ inprosopagnosia, suggesting configural 
processing but over a localregion. The question raised by such observations is whetherHJA did 
process local configural information from the mouthregion, which would explain why there is an 
inversion effect.This hypothesis needs further investigation. Nevertheless, evenif this assumption is 
verified, it remains the case that he used anabnormal strategy to perform the task.The data reported 
here emphasise the importance of showingthat face processing is qualitatively similar in patients and 
controls,before judgements are made about whether dissociationsreflect a difference between the 
computational uses to whichcommon information is put (e.g., for accessing facial identityrelative to 
facial emotion). In the present case, we suggest thatthere is a difference in theway facial features can 
be used to makecontrasting judgements, but there is not necessarily a differencebetween processing 
facial identity and emotion. A failure todemonstrate qualitative similarities between a residual ability 
ina patient and the normal process in controls means that it is possibleto challenge the view that two 
distinct and/or independentregions sustain identity and emotion processing (e.g., Baudouin,Martin, 
Tiberghien, Verlut, & Franck, 2002; Ganel& Goshen-Gottstein, 2004; Martin, Baudouin, 
Tiberghien,&Franck, 2005;Schweinberger, Burton, & Kelly, 1999; Tiberghien, Baudouin,Guillaume, 
&Montoute, 2003). 
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